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Lying and Cheating, or Self-Help and
Civil Disobedience?
Aditi Bagchi
†
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a tourist in a large city. Although it is not
cold, you stop to purchase an attractive scarf from a street vendor.
The vendor describes the scarf as 100% cashmere and asks $25
for the scarf. A cashmere scarf will usually cost at least $50.
However, this scarf is made of polyester and a polyester scarf of
comparable quality and design will normally sell for $5.
Many of us would say that the seller is lying and cheating.
He is lying when he tells you the scarf is cashmere and he is
cheating by charging you five times the market price for the scarf,
which is not the price he would charge a savvier local. By paying
more than market price, you are deprived of the opportunity to
spend the money on something else. If you would not have
purchased a polyester scarf for $25 even if that were the market
price, then you are actually worse off because of the transaction.
1
But let us add additional facts to the scenario. Imagine
the seller is poor and imagine you are rich. Assume that you are
part of the same political society, and assume too that this
society does not meet its obligations of distributive justice.
2
© Aditi Bagchi, 2020. The author has not granted rights to reprint this article under a
Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 License. Please contact the author
directly for reprint permission.
†
Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. J.D. Yale Law School; M.Sc. Oxford
University; A.B. Harvard College. Many thanks to participants in workshops at the
University of Amsterdam, Fordham University Law School, University of Michigan Law
School, University of Virginia Law School, University of Western Ontario Law School and
Yale Law School. Additional thanks to Bernadette Atuahene, Ian Ayres, Nicolas Cornell,
Hanoch Dagan, Howie Erichson, Christopher Essert, Kimberly Ferzan, AndrewGold, John
Goldberg, Abner Greene, Deborah Hellman, Scott Hershovitz, Martijn Hesselink, Gregory
Klass, Kyle Logue, Daniel Markovits, Gabriel Mendlow, Zoe Sinel, Steve Thel, Lyn Tjon
Soei Len and Benjamin Zipursky for their comments and feedback.
1
On a preference theory of well-being, this is true even if the buyer never learns
of the deceit. See SHELLYKAGAN, NORMATIVEETHICS 109 (1st ed. 1998) (discussing variety
of harms that flow from lies).
2
Many people who do not agree on abstract principles of justice will agree
that the United States is not presently compliant with the demands of distributive
justice (again, we will not agree on the degree of noncompliance). See Kate Andrias, An
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Without specifying what distributive justice requires, let us
suppose that you would be less rich and he would be less poor
under just institutions. The amount by which you are set back
in the transaction in question is negligible in relation either to
your “excess” property under unjust institutions or the seller’s
deficit. Does it make any difference to how you judge his conduct
toward you?
Some readers will be certain that lying and cheating are
morally reprehensible and the political economy against which it
takes place is irrelevant. Others, though, may recall uncomfortable
moments (perhaps in foreign countries) where you found yourself
negotiating with someone over what turned out to be a few cents
and realized that those cents mattered a great deal more to the
seller than to you. Some readers may want to know more.
3
Just
how poor is the seller? Just how rich am I supposed to be? And how
did I get rich and how did he get poor? On some answers to these
questions, some might conclude that overcharging a privileged
buyer is a legitimate form of self-help.
4
Inasmuch a seller flagrantly
and unapologetically declines to defer to unjust entitlements or the
rules of an unjustmarket, hemay be engaged in civil disobedience.
5
Iwill argue that the seller is lying but not cheating.However,
his lying is probably justified and should give rise to limited legal
recourse. My argument for that conclusion will incorporate the idea
that his conduct can be characterized as self-help. More generally, I
will suggest that the political morality of background institutions
shapes the private ethics of bilateral exchange. In making the case,
I hope to illustrate two points, which do not stand or fall together.
First, interpersonal privatemoral obligation depends on background
political justice. Second, interpersonal legal obligations (private law
obligations) should also depend on background political justice. The
overall picture is one where much of what is owed between
individuals depends on background justice; injusticemoves bilateral
relationships out of ideal theory, which describes rights and
obligations as they would stand in a state of the world where all
rights and obligations are respected. It may not be impossible to be
good against a backdrop of injustice but our deliberations about
American Approach to Social Democracy: The Forgotten Promise of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 128 YALE L.J. 616, 619 (2019) (“There is now widespread consensus that
economic inequality in the United States poses a growing and grave problem.”).
3
That is, while some might regard lying as categorically wrong, others are
prepared to make circumstantial allowances that license lying under particular
circumstances. The United States appears particularly hospitable to and forgiving of fraud
as compared to other Western countries. See EDWARD BALLEISEN, FRAUD: AN AMERICAN
HISTORY FROMBARNUM TOMADOFF 5 (2017).
4
See infra Section II.B.
5
See infra Section II.B.
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what morality requires of us vis-a-vis other individuals cannot
proceed without taking politics into account, if not at every turn,
then at some exhausting frequency.
Focused as it is on deconstructing a narrow hypothetical,
the claims in this article regarding the circumstances that generate
a license to lie are tentative. Of primary significance is the more
general claim that interpersonal moral and legal obligations
depend on political justice. The more specific but modest ambitions
pertain to the theory and doctrine governing consumer sales. First,
I hope to upset the usual (but not universal) assumption that
consumers are the vulnerable party in retail sales.
6
This starting
point is most plausible when the seller is a large corporation but
even in that case the picture is muddy. Matters are still messier
when the seller is socially disadvantaged but in a position to cheat
some buyers. Contract theory should not take consumer
vulnerability as its starting point but instead develop a more
refined framework and distribute interpretive presumptions
accordingly. Second, doctrinally, I will argue that our reading of
what qualifies as a representation should respond to background
facts of the sort laid out above, and I will defend the existing
indifference in law to imbalance of consideration standing alone.
Notably, my arguments are not instrumental. If sellers are
licensed to lie, it is not because of any imperative to actually move
dollars around so that we might achieve a moral equitable
distribution.
7
If lying is permitted in the central case, it responds
to a background wrong without undoing it. The seller’s lies must
appear analogous to a lie you might tell someone who herself
regularly lies to you. You may be licensed to lie to a liar even
though the lying does not achieve any good. Relatedly, my
analysis concerns only the question of whether the seller wrongs
the buyer by lying to her. This means, for example, that I exclude
consideration of potential injuries to third parties, such as other
vendors, that speak to whether the seller’s lie is a wrong tout
court, e.g., as a form of unfair competition that undermines the
market. A poor choice of self-defense that results in harm to
6
See LYN K. L. TJON SOEI LEN, MINIMUM CONTRACT JUSTICE: A CAPABILITIES
PERSPECTIVE ON SWEATSHOPS AND CONSUMER CONTRACTS 9 (2017) (observing that the
characterization of consumers as vulnerable juxtaposes them against powerful corporations
while ignoring other parties, such as sweatshop laborers, whose interests compete with those
of relatively privileged consumers).
7
For discussion of utilitarian theories of distributive justice, see generally P.J.
KELLY, UTILITARIANISMANDDISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: JEREMYBENTHAMANDTHECIVILLAW
(1st ed. 1990). For a utilitarian or instrumentalist critical review of the kind of liberal
account from which I proceed, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on
Rawls’s Theory of Justice, in 1 COLLECTEDPAPERS OFKENNETH J. ARROW: SOCIALCHOICE
AND JUSTICE 96 (1983).
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bystanders might give rise to claims by those bystanders against
their injurer. But it will not obviate her defense against the
original threat-maker.
8
Likewise, the fact that others might be
worse off as a result of the seller’s self-protective conduct might
render his conduct ultimately wrongful. But the interests of other
vendors do not render his conduct wrongful to the buyer—and it
would not be the particular wrong of lying. Of course, the interests
of others and myriad respects in which an action might be good or
bad are important when choosing a legal response.
9
It is also worth distinguishing the claim here from two
others: one, more modest; the other, more severe. First, I
highlight that the argument here stands on the premise of
background injustice and any justification for the seller’s lie
derives from that injustice and not bare necessity, which may or
may not characterize unjustified inequality. Most victims of
distributive injustice in advanced industrialized democracies are
not starving. Indeed, they can probably make a living without
routinely lying. Their choice to lie about their wares to buyers
may be justified nevertheless. However, I do not go so far as to
make a second, more radical claim: that sellers should have no
regret about the lies they tell.
10
It might be that even if a buyer is
not entitled to the truth from the seller, the seller should regret
the harm he inflicts on her, his departure from a personal practice
of truth-telling, and the social alienation to which he has
contributed. Nothing in this article is intended to suggest
otherwise. To the contrary, I will return at the end to the tragic
dimension of their encounter, one that is best understood as
among the moral fallouts of distributive injustice itself.
Part I below will set forth the parameters of the inquiry
here, comparing themorality of lying in contractwith lying in other
settings of legal import. Part II will set out the essential tension
between the private and public lenses on the exchange above. That
is, it will elaborate the intuition that the seller wrongs the buyer
by lying and cheating and then elaborate, separately, how the same
conduct might qualify as self-help or civil disobedience in light of
background distributive injustice. Subsequently, Part III will
8
MODELPENALCODE § 3.09(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (negligent injury of third
persons in the course of self-defense does not preclude “prosecution for such recklessness
or negligence towards innocent persons,” but it does not obviate the defense against the
original aggressor).
9
See infra Part III.
10
One could go still further and claim that sellers have a duty to resist injustice by
themeans available to them.Because I assume circumstances ofmoderate injustice, I assume
there is no duty to lie as a matter of resistance. Cf. Carol Hey, The Obligation to Resist
Oppression, 42 J. SOC. PHIL. 21, 21 (2011) (arguing that individuals have an obligation to
resist their own oppression that is “rooted in an obligation to protect their rational nature”).
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attempt to reconcile these perspectives. Part IV infers some brief
lessons for the law and theory of contract.
I. DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OFMISREPRESENTATIONS IN
CONTRACT FORMATION
The hypothetical around which the discussion proceeds is
intended to be neither the easiest nor the hardest case for
remedial lying. Consider two other cases in which lying is easier
and harder, respectively, to defend. May a prospective employee
lie to an employer about her race, religion, sex or family status?
Although it is not legally permitted,
11
it is possible to justify lying
about this information as a means of protection against
discrimination, even if lying is otherwise culpable.
12
Many of us
would consider this an easier case than the starting hypothetical.
Although the employee protects herself against discrimination
based on her social knowledge, her lie does not usually harm the
employer unless he would engage in unlawful discrimination. The
employee does not misrepresent any information to which the
employer is entitled. A discriminatory employer wrongs an
applicant by acting on her misrepresentation but a prospective
buyer has not and will not wrong the seller in that way. While
even this “easy” case raises difficult questions, there is, at least,
no conflict between institutional justice and individual morality.
The employee’s lie can be justified by the prospect of a bilateral
wrong, or a direct interpersonal wrong to the applicant by the
employer; by contrast, the street vendor’s lie cannot be justified
by any bilateral wrongdoing of the buyer.
13
11
See Holly Hill Lumber Co. v. McCoy, 23 S.E.2d 372, 378 (S.C. 1942) (“[I]t is
agreed that an informed vendee must limit himself to silence in order to escape the
imputation of fraud. If in addition to the party’s silence there is any statement, even in
word or act on his part, which tends affirmatively to a suppression of the truth, or to a
withdrawal or distraction of the other party’s attention or observation from the real facts,
the line is overstepped, and the concealment becomes fraudulent.”).
12
Ariel Porat andOmri Yadlin argue that lying by job applicants about protected
information should be legally permitted as a means by which to protect the policy that
underlies a right of nondisclosure. Ariel Porat & Omri Yadlin, A Welfarist Perspective on
Lies, 91 IND. L.J. 617, 617 (2016). Narrowly understood, their argument does not apply to
the central hypothetical of this article because lying by the vendor does not fall into any of
their four delineated categories of potentially permissible lies. See id. at 661–62.
Nevertheless, Porat andYadlin’s arguments, broadly conceived, may recommend a tolerant
attitude with respect to lies even outside the circumstances they discuss. Their arguments
seem to endorse welfare-promoting lies, generally. Neither my hypothetical nor our
collective knowledge of the lives of buyers and sellers is detailed enough to allow any
confident conclusion in this regard. My own arguments in defense of lying by vendors do
not depend on the supposition that such lies promote even thematerial interests of vendors,
let alone welfare at large.
13
I do consider infra notes 52–60 and accompanying text, the possibility that
exchange at market price against the background of unjust institutions might constitute
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Consider next a pickpocket who steals from apparently
rich people she finds on the street. It is harder to justify that kind
of stealing because the person on the street has no particular
responsibility for any incremental harm to the pickpocket. By
contrast, because we can expect a buyer in a competitive market
to walk away with most of the gains from trade, we can expect
that the buyer in our central hypothetical would gain more from
a transaction unmarred by lies than would the seller, thereby
exacerbating the inequality between them—even absent specific
wrongdoing by the buyer.
We might also distinguish the pickpocket on the grounds
that we have reason to regard property entitlements as generally
more robust than contract expectations. This might not be true
under conditions of extreme injustice that undermine the
legitimacy of all conventional entitlements that originate from
and are primarily backed by the state.
14
But we are concerned
with more moderate circumstances where the state as a whole is
not illegitimate; we are concerned with states of “moderate
injustice” in which there is no general right by any group to
disregard the law entirely.
15
It is difficult for a legal system to cope
with more radical illegitimacy since the very act of deciding cases
under law could amount to complicity.
16
But legal systems do and
should be responsive to moderate injustice. By taking background
injustice into account where it drives the facts of particular cases,
courts can render the exercise of state power more just on the
margins.
17
Most legal systems recognize themselves as imperfect
but not radically unjust.
a wrong but most of this article does not take that conclusion for granted. However,
without establishing culpability, the arguments of this essay do hinge on assigning moral
responsibility to a buyer for a transaction and its terms.
14
Tommie Shelby has recently argued that the United States may be so deeply
unjust that the social order “cannot reasonably expect allegiance from [the] oppressed
group.” TOMMIE SHELBY, DARKGHETTOS: INJUSTICE, DISSENT, ANDREFORM 215 (2016). In
particular, while natural duties persist in an unjust regime, “taking the possessions of
others, especially when these others are reasonably well off, may be permissible.” Id. at
220. For a defense of an insulated private law on the assumption that our society meets the
requisite standard of legitimacy, see Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and
Misfortune, 41 MCGILLL.J. 91, 93 (1995); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in
THE THEORY OFCONTRACTLAW: NEWESSAYS 259 (Peter Benson ed., 2001).
15
Most of private law theory proceeds under the assumption that modern post-
industrialized democracies like the United States are partially compliant but not radically
noncompliant. See, e.g., Coleman & Ripstein, supra note 14, at 93.
16
SeeH.L.A. HART, THECONCEPT OF LAW 210 (2d ed. 1994); Vivian Grosswald
Curran, Fear of Formalism: Indications from the Fascist Period in France and Germany
of Judicial Methodology’s Impact on Substantive Law, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 101, 134
(2002); J. C. Oleson, The Antigone Dilemma: When the Paths of Law and Morality
Diverge, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 669, 684 (2007).
17
See generally Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Injustice and Private Law, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 105 (2008) (arguing that doctrine of unconscionability in contract is
responsive to background injustice); see also Aditi Bagchi, The Contingent Politics of
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Within the context of moderate injustice, most legal
regimes treat contractual and property entitlements differently.
Notably, the consequences for theft are very different than for
breach of contract or misrepresentation in sales.
18
Many of the
reasons that justify treating a pickpocket differently than a
dishonest seller derive from this more general distinction. First,
involuntary takings of physical property often raise concerns
about personal security and even bodily integrity.
19
Second, we
have heightened expectations of stability with respect to our
property, at least in regard to its use value, and we plan
accordingly.
20
Finally, because personal property is mobile and
contracts bilateral, one can transfer things to avoid detection of
theft; it is easier to identify the party responsible when one’s
contract has gone awry. Not all of these distinctions apply across
all kinds of contract and property; our intuitions about the kind
of wrong done in contract or with respect to property also vary.
Comparing the particular cases of sales fraud and pickpocketing,
we can observe that pickpocketing is physically intrusive, the loss
entirely surprising and arbitrary, and one is unlikely ever to
identify the agent of wrongdoing. We might think these
considerations operate different in other cases of theft—e.g., theft
from a local bodega—and intuitions about the morality of theft
may adjust accordingly. Because each instance of ostensible self-
help introduces its own complications, in deconstructing the
fraudulent sales case, this article does not aim to justify other
forms of self-help such as theft. Indeed, my primary aim is not
even to vindicate our particular seller but to show that the
Legal Formalism, in THE LEGACY OFWESLEYHOHFELD: EDITEDMAJORWORKS, SELECT
PERSONAL PAPERS, AND ORIGINAL COMMENTARIES (Shyam Balganesh et al. eds., 2018)
(presenting idea of system regret and suggesting legal practice should be alert and
responsive to even justified normative disadvantages of our institutional choices).
18
Theft is a crime and may be punished with deprivation of liberty. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 223.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1962). The default remedy for breach of contract is
expectation damages and misrepresentation in sales allows for rescission (and sometimes
damages). For discussion of expectation damages as a basic remedy for breach of contract, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 344 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Ordinarily, when
a court concludes that there has been a breach of contract, it enforces the broken promise by
protecting the expectation that the injured party had when hemade the contract.”); E.ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.1, at 149–50 (3d ed. 2004) (describing
expectation damages as the default remedy for contract breach). For discussion of remedies
for misrepresentation, see Emily Sherwin, Nonmaterial Misrepresentation: Damages,
Rescission, and the Possibility of Efficient Fraud, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1017, 1017–18 (2003)
(“The two principal civil remedies for misrepresentation are tort damages and rescission [of
contract] accompanied by restitution of benefits conferred.”).
19
The wrong of physically taking something from someone is central to Kant’s
account of property, though he expands from there to intelligible possession. See
IMMANUELKANT, THEMETAPHYSICS OFMORALS 6:245 (Mary Gregor ed., 2016).
20
For a foundational account of the justificatory role of stability of expectations
in property theory, see DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, Bk. III, 484–501
(L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1896).
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interpersonal morality of an action, especially acts in the market,
turn on the political morality of background institutions.
II. PRIMA FACIE CONFLICT BETWEEN INTERPERSONAL AND
POLITICALMORALITY
Before we can arrive at any conclusions about the duties of
the seller or the rights of the buyer in this case, it is worth
investigating the prima facie, conflicting intuitions that
underwrite our dilemma. On the one hand, the seller engages in
conduct that, absent atmospheric embellishment, is not only
deceitful but straightforward lying. His conduct also defies
ordinary expectations that a seller will not “overcharge” a
consumer that is in some way vulnerable to exploitation, including
on grounds of poor information.
21
These demands may be reflected
in law but they get off the ground in the space of interpersonal
morality. Even apart from any legal regulation of exchange, lying
and cheating are bilateral wrongs by one person against another.
22
Knowing falsehoods are lies, and lying is prima facie wrong. Our
seller wrongs the buyer when he falsely describes a good that he
aims to sell, and by inducing her in this way to pay well over
market price for the good, he cheats her of money that she could
have spent otherwise.
At the same time, a more sympathetic account of the
seller is possible in the domain of political morality.
23
While some
egalitarian accounts purport only to describe major social
institutions, or the basic structure of society, others recognize
that distributive justice implicates individual behavior as well.
24
This line of argument has two kinds of implications for sellers.
First, we might think of sellers’ behavior as directly justified on
grounds that it amounts to self-help that ameliorates large-scale
distributive injustice. It ameliorates the injustice not by undoing
it in any substantial way but, as in the case of most inadequate
21
See Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking:
Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 734 (1986) (arguing that consumers
feel entitled to a reference price).
22
My account is focused on this bilateral wrong of lying and whether it is
defeated by background injustice in this case. To the extent lies are also wrongs to the
world at large, as on a utilitarian theory, or to oneself, on a virtue-based account, the
background injustice at issue is less likely to diffuse the wrong.
23
I am not committed here to any single theory of distributive justice, though
my language is evocative of the theory advanced by John Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (1971) (setting forth his account of “justice as fairness”). However,
any theory of distributive justice under which the existing distribution is unjust, and
under which this amounts to a wrong to individuals disadvantaged by that distribution,
is compatible with the arguments advanced here.
24
See infra notes 58–64 and accompanying text.
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remedies, obtaining a reverse transfer acknowledges the
underlying injustice. Alternatively, we might characterize buyers’
objective of extracting a generous share of the transactional
surplus as a kind of wrong that justifies defensive behavior by
sellers. In either case, the sellers’ conduct is responsive to an
underlying wrong—whether collective or individual—and can be
characterized as self-help.
We could go further. To the extent sellers flout existing rules
of exchange that unjustly privilege already socially advantaged
buyers, their behavior can be interpreted as civil disobedience. The
aim of this Part is to show how we might be tempted to think of
sellers’ conduct at once as lying and cheating, and as self-help and
civil disobedience. It will be the aim of the next Part to reconcile the
separate perspectives suggested by interpersonal morality and
political morality, respectively.
A. Lying and Cheating
In our hypothetical, the seller tells the buyer that the
scarf is made of cashmere although it is not. We can assume that
the seller knows this. By most definitions of lying, his assertion
amounts to a lie. While most people agree that not all lies are
wrong—the favorite example is a lie to the murderer at your
door—a lie is presumptively wrong.
25
At least at first blush, it
looks like the reasons we have for regarding lying as wrongful
apply in this case.
Alasdair MacIntyre locates the “evil” of lying “in its capacity
for corrupting and destroying the integrity of rational
relationships.”
26
Seana Shiffrin has said that the “wrong of lying is
that it operates on a maxim that, if it were universalized and
constituted a public rule of permissible action, would deprive us of
reliable access to a crucial set of truths and a reliable way to sort the
true from the false.”
27
Both authors are getting at the idea that we
rely on truthful assertions to communicate with one another and
know things about each other and theworld. Lying compromises the
reliability of our assertions and thereby undermines understanding
between people and of our environment, each of which is essential to
human flourishing. Sissela Bok emphasized the importance of
25
Because I am concerned here with lying as a wrong to the buyer, I do not
consider accounts of lying that sound solely in virtue ethics, that is, which focus on the
effects of lying on the liar’s own character.
26
Alasdair MacIntyre, Truthfulness, Lies, and Moral Philosophers: What Can We
Learn fromMill and Kant?, inTHETANNERLECTURES ONHUMANVALUES 307, 355 (1994).
27
SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY AND
THE LAW 23 (2014).
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truthful communication to social functioning, arguing that “trust in
some degree of veracity functions as a foundation of relations among
human beings; when this trust shatters or wears away, institutions
collapse.”
28
For this reason, “some level of truthfulness has always
been seen as essential to human society, nomatter how deficient the
observance of other moral principles.”
29
Lying to strangers about the product you are selling
impairs a particular social institution, the market. It is an
institution that is fundamental to most modern societies. Lying to
prospective buyers also erodes even that minimalist trust that
strangers in large, anonymous societies bear toward one another.
The erosion of this trust is especially insidious because the people
who encounter each other in exchanges like that described in the
starting hypothetical will rarely encounter members of the other
group in other settings, let alone cooperative contexts in which
trust is implicated. So the lessons they learn about each other in
the course of a simple transaction may endure.
One might argue that the seller’s assertions about the
scarf are not lies because they are not necessarily motivated by
an intent to deceive. Maybe the seller just wants to convey that
the scarf is so soft that it could be mistaken for cashmere. Maybe
the seller does not think that the buyer will believe him. On
some definitions of lying, the intention to lead someone else to
believe the proposition at issue is “essential.”
30
However, these are implausible characterizations of the
seller’s intent. Deception is a prerequisite to the intended effect
of his assertion, that is, extracting a high price from buyer. The
buyer can directly assess the softness of the fabric but will only
pay the higher price that cashmere commands if she is
persuaded that it really is cashmere, or that it might be. Even if
the seller cannot be sure that a given buyer will think it is
cashmere with sufficient certainty as to act on that belief, the
seller’s aim in asserting that the scarf is cashmere is to cause
the buyer to proceed as if it were cashmere.
31
A buyer might not
believe that the scarf is cashmere but harbor just enough hope
that it tips her decision to buy. That is, a buyer’s beliefs about a
28
SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 31 (1978)
(emphasis omitted).
29
Id. at 18.
30
ARNOLD ISENBERG, DEONTOLOGY AND THE ETHICS OF LYING (1964), reprinted
in AESTHETICS AND THE THEORY OF CRITICISM: SELECTED ESSAYS OF ARNOLD ISENBERG
245, 249 (William Callaghan et al. eds., 1973).
31
Isenberg specifically claims that an advertiser who describes his goods beyond
its merits in the hopes of deceiving at least some buyers is a liar. Even an advertiser who
makes exorbitant claims in order to create a “partial or subconscious belief” is a “borderline
liar.” Id. at 251.
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good are always subject to degrees of certainty, and the seller
aims here to make the buyer more confident, even if still
doubtful, about the proposition that the scarf is cashmere. Even
if the seller knows that some buyers will discount his assertion
entirely, he makes the representation with the aim of deceiving
more credulous buyers.
32
Although the seller may be uncertain
whether his statement will effectively deceive a given buyer, the
assertion is a lie in each case. If I lie to everyone about whether
I attended a certain gathering, the fact that there are some
people who independently know that I was there does not save
the assertion from being a lie. Similarly, the possibility that a
given buyer will not attach any weight to the seller’s assertion
does not redeem it. Since the seller cannot separate credulous
and incredulous buyers in advance, his assertion can be treated
as a blanket lie.
Some definitions of lying are less focused on seller’s
intent to deceive in any event. Paul Faulkner argues that “[t]o
involve its distinctive manipulative mechanism a lie must
purport to provide information to someone who is dependent on
the liar for this information.”
33
Andreas Stokke argues that “you
lie when you assert something you believe to be false” and
thereby proposes that it become common ground.
34
These more
expansive definitions emphasize the intended reliance by the
listener on the speaker. They appear to track the kind of reliance
a seller can expect from a buyer.
It looks, then, that common accounts of lying apply to the
seller’s conduct in the hypothetical. Turning to the claim that
seller’s conduct also amounts to a kind of “cheating,” we do not have
the benefit of the same long-standing conceptual analysis of the
amorphous concept of “cheating” that we have with respect to the
concept of “lying.” Nevertheless, without attempting to work out a
general definition of cheating, it seems likely that charging
someone a price wholly out of line with the market price of a
service, and substantially higher than what the seller himself
would ordinarily charge other buyers, qualifies as cheating on a
colloquial understanding. Such conduct is regarded as cheating
because it fails to abide by prevailing norms—not positive legal
rules but generally stated “economic laws” that predict
32
Id. at 251 (“[A]n advertiser who makes a false claim for his product in the
hope that, though most will not believe him, some people may, is a liar.”).
33
Paul Faulkner,What Is Wrong with Lying?, 75 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RES. 535, 535 (2007).
34
Andreas Stokke, Lying and Asserting, 110 J. PHIL. 33, 33 (2013).
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homogenous pricing and the perceived social order of the market.
35
Those implicit rules usually demand that any given seller charge
nomore (or not substantiallymore) than other sellers, and that she
charge all buyers the same price without price discrimination.
36
Charging a buyer more relative to other sellers and buyers can be
thought of as unfair because it fails to abide by the unwritten rules
of market exchange, which are ordinarily self-enforcing.
37
Even if
we think that price discrimination is not inherently problematic
(and even potentially efficient and progressively distributive), it
might warrant suspicion if sustained price discrimination over
time involves some kind of deception.
38
Price discrimination in this case has the effect of altering
the parties’ share of the transactional surplus, andmight actually
make the transaction a losing transfer for the buyer. That is, the
buyer would gain more from the transaction than would the seller
but for the seller’s lie. While people tend in experiments to expect
an equal division of the gains from trade,
39
such a division would
only take place in practice where parties have equal bargaining
power.
40
In consumer transactions in competitive markets (where
seller has no market power), consumers are accustomed to
reaping almost all of the transactional surplus.
41
Seller’s conduct
in our hypothetical is a marked contrast. His overcharging of the
buyer exploits a contextual advantage with the result that he
benefits more from the transaction than he ordinarily would, and
at the direct expense of the buyer.
35
See Kahneman et al., supra note 21, at 730 (consumers may punish firms that
charge them more than reference price, which is often the price that the consumer knows
that the firm charges others).
36
We do not usually expect fine-grained price discrimination in practice or in
theory because it is too costly for sellers. See Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of
Private Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063, 2072 (2000).
37
See supra notes 35–36.
38
See Akiva A. Miller, What Do We Worry About When We Worry About Price
Discrimination? The Law and Ethics of Using Personal Information for Pricing, 19 J.
TECH. L. & POL’Y 41, 80–84 (2014) (discussing price discrimination and deception); Mark
Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. L. REV. 317, 327–29, 355–
61, 367–68 (2002).
39
See Alvin E. Roth, Bargaining Experiments, in THE HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 253–348 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995); Colin
Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators andManners, J. ECON.
PERSP., Spring 1995, at 209, 210–14 (reviewing ultimatum bargaining experiments).
40
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante
View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601, 615 (2001) (noting that if “the parties have
equal bargaining power” they “will share equally in any gains from mutual trade”);
Dotan Oliar, The Copyright-Innovation Tradeoff: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Intentional Infliction of Harm, 64 STAN. L. REV. 951, 1009 (2012); Ian Ayres & Kristin
Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and Contracts, 148 U. PA.
L. REV. 45, 49 (1999).
41
MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS
41 (1996).
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Again, the aim in this discussion so far has not been to
definitively establish that seller’s conduct qualifies as lying and
cheating. In fact, I will revisit the above analysis later. The goal was
only to set out a tentative set of plausible judgements. The following
section generates a conflicting set of plausible judgements.
B. Self-Help and Civil Disobedience
Many readers may see the logic of lying and cheating as
more readily applicable to the hypothetical than the language of
self-help and civil disobedience. The aim of this section is not to
definitively show that the seller’s assertions and pricing are
ultimately justified but only to make a compelling case that they
might be. Again, the goal is to see that the seller’s conduct is
likely to be appraised quite differently depending on whether
one adopts the vantage point of interpersonal morality or the
macro perspective of distributive justice.
First, we consider how the seller’s conduct might be
understood as a form of self-help. Calling it self-help suggests that
seller’s conduct is remedial and responds to inadequate state
action. Although in the usual model of self-help the underlying
wrong is private and prior to state inaction, here the underlying
wrong is public.
42
In fact, whether there is a wrong of distributive
justice in a given society and what should be done to correct it are
quintessential political questions. This means that to make a
plausible case for self-help here, one has to reject a conceptual
barrier by which public rights andwrongs play out in an insulated
sphere and cannot as a matter of principle give rise to private
recourse. One does not, however, have to contend that in a well-
ordered society, people are entitled to unilaterally adjust their
share of resources by taking from others, by way of contract or
otherwise. The self-help here is only plausibly legitimate where
the first-choice institutional mechanisms by which to resolve
distributive justice have failed. To the extent a seller is simply
wrong about background injustice, he has no genuine license to
lie. Even though it is always unsettling to allow individuals to
take matters into their own hands at the expense of others, the
argument for self-help will cast the procedural defect in the
42
See Edward L. Rubin, The Code, the Consumer, and the Institutional
Structure of the Common Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 11, 36 (1997) (“Self-help can be defined
as one party’s ability to take control of an item or sum of money in dispute without
judicial intervention.”); see also Mark P. Gergen, A Theory of Self-Help Remedies in
Contract, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1397 (2009); Douglas Lichtman,How the Law Responds to Self-
Help, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 215 (2005).
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seller’s conduct as reflective or symptomatic of background
injustice rather than an independent wrong.
43
Of course, the chosen method of response to the
underlying public wrong—lying—is a prima facie private wrong
in itself.
44
We invoke the self-help label here in typical fashion—
defensively—to justify an action that would otherwise be
impermissible. But it is not literal ex-post self-help: No one is
claiming that the seller should have the power to demand that
an incredulous buyer who buys at a low price return a portion of
her consumer surplus back to the seller.
45
Applying the concept here requires that we identify more
specifically the wrong to which the seller responds, that is, the
wrong for which he effectively compensates himself without
relying on ineffective or unavailable state remedies to which he
would in principle be entitled.
46
There are two kinds of wrongs in
the air that could fit the bill: the collective wrong of distributive
injustice, or the individual wrong that the buyer might commit in
attempting to win a substantial, if not majority, share of the gains
from trade. Although these framings are importantly distinct
from one another, in both cases the underlying wrong cannot be
conceived except by reference to the background—and public—
wrong of distributive injustice. Even if our buyer wrongs the seller
by leveraging all her bargaining power, her conduct is wrongful
only because of background distributive injustice.
47
To recognize the seller’s conduct as self-help against the
first type of wrong, a collective wrong, we must accept that there
is distributive injustice in the society in which the transaction
43
Andrew Gold has argued that “it is doubtful that conformity to the nemo
iudex principle is always required in order for other types of justice to legitimately be
obtained.” Andrew S. Gold, Private Rights and Private Wrongs, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1071,
1093 (2017) (reviewing ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, PRIVATEWRONGS (2016)).
44
See supra Section II.A.
45
It is operating as a moral privilege. See Zoe Sinel, De-Ciphering Self-Help,
67 U. TORONTO L.J. 31, 50–51 (2017).
46
I do not claim that the seller’s lying is plausibly encompassed by any existing
legal doctrine of self-help. See F.H. LAWSON, REMEDIES OF ENGLISH LAW 1 (2d ed. 1980).
But many legal concepts piggy-back on moral ones, and we might expect that the
individuals are morally entitled to pursue some recourse against wrongdoers even where
the state does not officially allow it. That is, we might recognize self-help even where it is
not part of the remedial scheme recognized by the state. In these cases, the requisite state
failure lies not in failing to uphold a legal right by way of its own enforcement powers but
in its failure to recognize the primary wrong at all. Nevertheless, as I will argue infra Part
IV, withholding adequate enforcement of the primary wrongdoer’s rights (here, the buyer’s
rights under consumer law) may implicitly sanction the seller’s self-help after all.
47
Contracting parties typically exercise bargaining power, as in the case of a
successful business buying assets from a struggling firm. We do not ordinarily treat such
market behavior as wrongful. The exercise of market power is only problematic in our
hypothetical because of background injustice. For this reason, neither way of understanding
the buyer’s conduct is as a simple bilateral wrong. Cf. supra notes 11–12 and accompanying
text (discussing the employment discrimination example).
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takes place, and that this represents a wrong to each individual
who is worse off than she would be under just institutions. We
would then further have to conclude that lying about the material
of which a scarf is made is an appropriate form of self-help, i.e.,
that it imposes burdens fairly and proportionately. By contrast, a
seller who would lie about the purity of medicine or baby formula
is not just lying and effecting a de minimus monetary transfer;
such a seller would inflict bodily harm.Whether or when it is ever
appropriate to physically hurt someone to correct distributive
injustice is beyond the scope of this discussion: I assume the
transfer in our case is small.
Even if the transfer is small,
48
in order that it not be
arbitrary, wemust explain why any particular buyer appropriately
bears the cost of self-help.
49
In relying on collective wrongdoing, we
avoid characterizing the individual buyer as culpable. But we still
need to find her responsible for the collective wrong—she must
stand in the right relation to it—such that it is fair that she bears
some of the costs associated with the state of injustice.
50
In other
work, I have argued that the doctrine of unconscionability
sometimes operates to allow a party to avoid a contractual
obligation when the transaction exploits and exacerbates
distributive injustice.
51
In our hypothetical, the advantaged buyer
is advantaged vis-a-vis the seller by virtue of distributive justice;
she profits from it. Moreover, her expected gains from the
prospective transaction unmarred by dishonesty are possible only
because of that injustice. Finally, because seller’s margins are
driven to zero in a competitive market,
52
the distributions of gains
48
The de minimus nature of buyer’s monetary loss is still significant in that
the degree of “fit” required is less than in the case of a more dramatic loss. For example,
we might think we need only a reasonable basis for believing that a particular buyer is
responsible; if the prospective loss were grave, then we might require something
approaching certainty.
49
See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in THE THEORY OF
CONTRACTS LAW: NEW ESSAYS 206, 257 (Peter Benson ed., 2001) (rejecting redistribution
in contract law as “completely haphazard”); Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare
State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations
on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 284 (1995) (“Critics further argue that
the welfare system provides a more equitable way to redistribute wealth than legal rules
do, because legal rules redistribute wealth only to people who happen to be injured or
people in the class of those likely to be injured in a way that can be redressed by courts—a
small and arbitrarily selected portion of the needy population.”).
50
See Coleman & Ripstein, supra note 14, at 93 (“Corrective justice concerns the
rectification of losses owing to private wrongs. In contrast, distributive justice concerns the
general allocation of resources, benefits, opportunities, and the like. The duty to repair
under corrective justice is agent-specific—only wrongdoers need make up the losses of
others. The duties imposed by distributive justice are, in contrast, agent-general—everyone
has a duty to create and sustain just distributions.”)
51
See Bagchi, supra note 17, at 109.
52
See Jeffrey M. Rosenfeld, Spiders and Crawlers and Bots, Oh My: The
Economic Efficiency and Public Policy of Online Contracts That Restrict Data Collection,
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from an honest sale will exacerbate background injustice. These
considerations justify holding her responsible for the moral upshot
of the transaction even if she is not culpable for it.
Indeed, the primary advantage of this first “collective
wrong” account is that it does not treat the buyer’s willingness to
buy at market price as an independent wrong. It thus avoids the
implication that such transactions must be avoided generally.
53
Importantly different from cases of unconscionability, in which
one party’s behavior is “shocking,”
54
the buyer in our hypothetical
behaves just as she is expected to. She conforms to market norms.
Because the totality of those institutions that authorize her
behavior is unjust, the license she derives from them is defective.
But she has not overstepped the bounds that have been socially
constructed for her, and on which—absent extraordinary
circumstances—she is entitled to rely. The market has enough
redeeming features, and is sufficiently bound up with our entire
social structure, that we cannot afford to treat its imprimatur on
conduct as wholly inert without making moral life incompatible
with ordinary life as we know it.
55
It alters the normative
character of conduct taken under its auspices even if it cannot
wholly redeem it.
Nevertheless, given the moral taint on acts that depend on
unjust structures, we should also consider a potential wrong by
the individual buyer. On this alternative “individual wrong”
account, we would argue that the buyer is not just responsible for
the background wrong of injustice but herself stands to wrong the
seller. The seller in this argument appears to claim something
more like self-defense than self-help. Let us call this the self-
protection claim.
56
The idea is that a person is entitled to take
2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 17 (“[T]he conventional Bertrand economics model predicts
that price competition among vendors will reduce prices to the marginal cost of production,
with sellers generating zero profits.”).
53
There are people who structure their lives to ensure that all their market
transactions occur on “fair terms,” not only vis-a-vis their contracting partners but also
with regard to the suppliers and workers that appear earlier in the transactional chains
that lead up to their own direct purchases. However, it is extremely burdensome and
limiting to live this way. And it is reasonable to suppose that while it might be admirable
or virtuous to do so, it is unlikely to be morally compulsory. See SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE
REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM 19–22 (1994) (on demandingness as a constraint on
moral theory); BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 99–100 (1973);
Liam B. Murphy, The Demands of Beneficence, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 267, 275 (1993).
54
See Ski River Dev., Inc. v. McCalla, 167 S.W.3d 121, 136 (Tex. App. 2005)
(only shocking terms are unconscionable).
55
For an elaboration of the argument that moral theories and the demands they
make are appropriately constrained by the requirement that, absent extraordinary
circumstances, people should be allowed to devote their lives primarily to their own self-
authored projects, see SCHEFFLER, supra note 53, at 19–22; Murphy, supra note 53, at 275.
56
Cf. KAGAN, supra note 1, at 116 (discussing how lying in self-defense may lie
outside the scope of the moral constraint against lying).
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steps to prevent an imminent wrong where there is nomechanism
of the state that will prevent it, and no adequate legal redress. It
is better to call this self-protection than self-defense because the
alleged imminent wrong is the buyer’s purchase of the scarf at
market price, not any criminal conduct or free-standing wrong
under public law.
The self-protection argument only gets off the ground if
the buyer’s quite ordinary market behavior is actually a wrong
to the seller. This claim may be supported by certain powerful
lines of critique proffered against the Rawlsian idea of the basic
structure as the site of distributive justice.
57
Many authors have doubted that political liberalism or
egalitarian justice can be sustained absent individual attitudes
that are other-regarding in the marketplace.
58
G.A. Cohen
famously rejects the assumption in Rawls that, because
individuals maximize their own wealth, material incentives are
required to induce the talented to work.
59
He argues that “social
justice requires a social ethos that inspires uncoerced equality-
supporting choice.”
60
Although he expressly sets aside “the choice
whether or not to comply with the rules of such structures[,]” he
concludes that “principles of distributive justice . . . apply . . . to
people’s legally unconstrained choices” or “to the choices that
people make within the legally coercive structures.”
61
Others are
not prepared to go so far in their interpretation of the difference
principle but similarly conclude that principles of justice create
some demands on individuals.
62
Michael Titelbaum argues that
“[t]he types of attitudes that lead individuals to support the two
principles of justice are not compatible with just any kind of
behavior in their private lives.”
63
Seana Shiffrin argues that,
since citizens in a well-ordered society typically accept the public
justifications for public institutions, they will be committed to
the view that “talents are arbitrary from a moral point of view”
57
See infra notes 61–64.
58
See generally Joshua Cohen, Taking People as They Are?, 30 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 363, 385 (2001) (on the role of an egalitarian ethos in making egalitarian justice
compatible with political liberalism).
59
See G.A. Cohen, Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice, 26
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 8–10 (1997).
60
Id. at 13.
61
Id. at 3.
62
See Michael G. Titelbaum, What Would a Rawlsian Ethos of Justice Look
Like?, 36 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 289, 295 (2008) (arguing that Rawls’ account of people’s “sense
of justice” applied only to “cases of voting and officialdom”). Titelbaum allows for individual
decisions that disserve the worst-off where “necessary for the development and exercise of
the moral powers.” Id. at 319 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
63
Id. at 299.
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and for this reason would be unjustified in insisting on material
incentives for use of those talents.
64
Following G.A. Cohen, the typical example in the
discussion of egalitarian ethos is a talented individual who must
decide whether to demand high compensation on the labor
market.
65
But the logic applies to consumer transactions as well.
To the extent distributive justice requires that individuals act in
the marketplace in a way that advances the interests of the
socially disadvantaged, the buyer in our hypothetical commits a
wrong—and perhaps wrongs the seller—by insisting on the
advantages she enjoys by virtue of her status as a privileged
consumer. The seller might appropriately and defensively
respond by denying the buyer that advantage by the only means
available to the seller.
The argument for civil disobedience is still trickier but
also serves to capture the basic intuition that the injustice
against which the transaction takes place creates some license
for the seller. Civil disobedience is usually understood to include
a number of elements, though unsurprisingly, there is no single
list on which everyone agrees. The main requirements are that
it involve an illegal action, committed openly, nonviolently,
conscientiously (deliberately rather than impulsively), with the
intention of frustrating a law, and the actor accepts the
repercussions under the legal system.
66
Seller’s conduct seems to
fail at least two of these requirements: it appears to be neither
open nor undertaken with the purpose of frustrating a law.
These are important elements of civil disobedience. Rawls
argued specifically that civil disobedience is not “covert or
secretive,” it is “a political act not only in the sense that it is
addressed to the majority that holds political power, but also
because it is an act guided and justified by political principles.”
67
Kimberley Brownlee argues that “to remain silent necessarily
casts doubt on the sincerity of [the protestor’s] conviction that the
conduct [being protested] is seriously wrong.”
68
Rawls addresses
behavior that protests distribution in particular and suggests
that violations of the difference principle do not lend themselves
to civil disobedience because of the complexity of the principle’s
64
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Incentives, Motives, and Talents, 38 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 111, 121 (2010).
65
See Cohen, supra note 58, at 366–67.
66
See H. A. Bedau, Civil Disobedience and Personal Responsibility for Injustice,
in CIVILDISOBEDIENCE IN FOCUS 49, 51 (Hugo Bedau ed., 1991).
67
RAWLS, supra note 23, at 321.
68
KIMBERLEY BROWNLEE, CONSCIENCE AND CONVICTION: THE CASE FOR CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE 29 (2012) (citing ANTHONY DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND
COMMUNITY 28 (2001)).
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application, and because “it is difficult to check the influence of
self-interest and prejudice.”
69
He concludes that “[t]he resolution
of these issues is best left to the political process.”
70
Since seller does not announce his own deceit, is
presumably motivated by self-interest, and responds to precisely
the kind of distributive injustice that Rawls regards as too plagued
with uncertainty to justify civil disobedience, it is not obvious how
we can characterize seller’s conduct as a kind of civil disobedience.
We can get this perspective off the ground though, if we revisit the
assumptions about seller’s conduct that I have made thus far.
In particular, upon reflection we might conclude both
that seller’s conduct is open and that it is motivationally
connected in the right way with background injustice. Finally,
we might find that even if the precise demands of distributive
injustice are uncertain, sellers can reasonably conclude that the
structure in which they operate is unjust.
71
Seller’s conduct
might be open in the sense that the assertions they make are
easily proven false and they do not take any steps to avoid that
disclosure. In fact, most buyers might recognize the falsehood.
Although the assertion still qualifies as a lie inasmuch as it aims
to deceive some fraction of the listeners to whom it is addressed,
it is open in the sense that it is made with the expectation that
most listeners will recognize it as false. Seller’s lie is a bald-faced
lie, and open for just that reason.
The seller is not motivated to expose or protest injustice
in the typical sense associated with acts of civil disobedience. He
aims to make more money of the transaction; he is not thinking
of capitalism or agitating for a more progressive regime of tax
and transfer. By contrast, civil rights activists who sat at whites-
only counters were not in it for the food; their aim was to
overturn segregation. Similarly, individuals that publicly
burned their draft cards during the Vietnam War were not
ineptly evading the draft; they were protesting the war.
We have reason, though, to be wary of the scholarly
consensus that demands such high-minded purpose of would-be
protestors. Although there have been historical periods in which
everyday people engaged in mass civil disobedience, most of the
time, only the socially privileged are in a position to challenge law
in the way that the concept of civil disobedience seems to
69
RAWLS, supra note 23, at 372.
70
Id.
71
For an account of the subtle ways in which the fact of injustice might figure
into the psychology of resistance, see ANN E. CUDD, ANALYZINGOPPRESSION 190 (2006).
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require.
72
Although the moral license to disobey law depends to
some extent on failure of democratic institutions, only those who
believe they have the power to effect change through their actions
will engage in civil disobedience. Individuals who are largely
invisible to society will have no expectation that their failure to
obey a law will cause anyone to reconsider the justice of the law
they broke. In order to conceive civil obedience in less elite terms,
we might expand it to include disobedience of laws that the law-
breaker justifies to himself by reference to the injustice of the law.
Many socially disadvantaged people will not expect a wide
audience for their behavior, and they will rightfully doubt that a
public audience will glean from their law-breaking just the
message of protest that a law-breaker might intend. But to the
extent injustice plays a role in the self-understanding of a law-
breaker, it might meet a modified version of the purpose test
traditionally included as an element of civil disobedience. Perhaps
we need to develop concepts that capture the idea of resistance
outside of civil disobedience as such.
Tommie Shelby’s recent book defending at least forms of
legal noncompliance—where such conduct does not violate
natural duties—seems to capture the idea of resistance that does
not amount to civil disobedience, strictly speaking.
73
But even
Shelby distinguishes between politicallymotivated dissent, which
he characterizes as derivative from a duty of self-respect, and
entirely self-interested, private action.
74
Since the lying at issue
in our hypothetical is directed to other citizens, and because the
duty to speak truthfully might be a natural duty, seller’s conduct
might not fall within even Shelby’s account of resistance.
75
I have
assumed that seller aims only to recover a larger amount of the
transactional surplus, not to change—or even protest—the basic
structure of society.
Because it is not my aim to elaborate a general theory of
resistance, I do not attempt to advance further a defense of
seller’s lie as legitimate resistance, let alone civil disobedience.
72
See STANLEY A. WOLPERT, A NEW HISTORY OF INDIA 301–50 (7th ed. 2004)
(describing mass civil disobedience in India); Neeshan Balton, Principles, Tactics, and
Negotiations with the Oppressor, 20 YALEHUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 31, 33 (2019) (describing
mass civil disobedience in South Africa); Zachary Norris, Repairing Harm from Racial
Injustice: An Analysis of the Justice Reinvestment Initiative and the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, 94 DENV. L. REV. 515, 519–20 (2017) (describing civil
disobedience in U.S. civil rights movement). Notwithstanding these historically significant
moments, absent unique momentum, socially disadvantaged persons cannot expect their
individual acts of civil disobedience to be consequential for society, and they can expect the
law to be applied harshly to them.
73
See SHELBY, supra note 14.
74
Id. at 221.
75
Id. at 215.
2020] LYING AND CHEATING 375
But the idea of resistance continues to do work for us as we
deconstruct the political nature of self-help in this context. After
all, self-help in private law is usually responsive to purely
private wrongdoing, and some readers may feel uneasy about
the application of the self-help concept to our seller for that
reason. Yet the element of political resistance in seller’s conduct
is not enough to redeem it on traditional understandings of civil
disobedience. Seller thus risks falling into a peculiar gap in our
theoretical constructs surrounding how individuals may respond
to wrongdoing: Injustice in the marketplace is usually private
and small on the margin—it materializes by way of small private
transactions—but it is only unjust in light of broader structures
that are not the doing of any single contracting party. Individual
acts of resistance are of a similar, mixed character, and thus risk
being both too public (in justification) to qualify as self-help and
too private (in motivation) to qualify as civil disobedience.
The result is that none of the concepts of self-help, self-
protection, or civil disobedience applies neatly to seller’s conduct.
But even if those labels do not apply, they get at the idea that social
injustice may create individual license. The next Part attempts to
reconcile the indictment on interpersonal moral grounds with the
defenses that seller might muster from the perspective of political
morality. I focus on the defense of self-help.
III. RECONCILING THEDEMANDS OF INTERPERSONAL
MORALITY AND POLITICAL JUSTICE
The task of reconciliation assumes its possibility. We
might abandon the project by pronouncing the interpersonal
morality of exchange and the political morality that governs
exchange irreconcilable, derivative from two separate moral
spheres that do not allow for integrated analysis. But this
delivers the unsatisfying result that the seller’s conduct is both
wrongful and justified.
76
To gain traction on the moral upshot of
his conduct, we must either draw jurisdictional lines that avoid
conflict between the two moral perspectives, or resolve them
substantively. In the first section below, I attempt the first
76
It would be coherent to think the conduct is both wrong and excused but the
argument here is importantly not an argument for excuse. The argument is not, for
example, that natural feelings of resentment or alienation incapacitate poor sellers to the
point where they cannot be expected to comply with moral or legal obligation. Such
arguments are descriptively implausible (and offensive, to boot). The claim on the table is
not that they should be exempted from a universal moral obligation but rather that the
obligation is not universal, and, in particular, it does not apply under the circumstances of
the hypothetical sale. The claim under consideration is not that vendors are not responsible
for their lies but rather that they are entitled to lie.
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strategy of separation. It fails. I then attempt a second strategy,
specification. The latter approach helps carve out a potential
justification for seller’s prima facie wrong.
A. Private and Political Morality as Separate and Ordered
Spheres
One way to handle the apparent conflict is to say that
political morality creates a license that it is improper to exercise.
We might similarly say, for example, that it is morally improper
to insist on a property right that disadvantages a person of
superior need. For example, it would be wrong to refuse to lend
a car to someone who needs to go to the hospital, even though
the legal system does not recognize any duty to lend one’s car.
On this approach, we effectively relegate interpersonal morality
to extra-legal space and allow the politics to fully occupy the
legal terms. Sellers would be wrong to lie and cheat but, in light
of their own disadvantage, the law could decline to offer buyers
any remedy; or at least, the legal regime should not be designed
to express moral opprobrium. Interestingly, such a view bears
some similarity to the position that economically privileged
individuals might behave wrongly from the standpoint of ethics
when they exploit their advantages in the marketplace but their
behavior does not have any significance from the standpoint of
public justice.
77
Although such a separation formally manages the conflict,
it is unsatisfactory on both fronts: it indicts the seller from amoral
perspective more categorically than is warranted. And it offers no
legal protection to buyers at all, which exaggerates the bounds of
any license for seller.
We could try the opposite tack, more familiar to legal
theory. We could insist that the political claims of the seller be
dealt with entirely through public law, and insist that private
77
Cf. Andrew Williams, Incentives, Inequality, and Publicity, 27 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 225, 234 (1998) (“[S]ome choices, although they may be profoundly influential, cannot
be regarded as according with, or violating, public rules. Consequently the nonpublic
strategies and maxims that individuals employ in making those choices need not be
assessed as just or unjust . . . .”); see alsoKok-Chor Tan, Justice and Personal Pursuits, 101
J. PHIL. 331, 334 (2004) (noting that “institutional egalitarianism” does not require as a
matter of justice that people “be egalitarians in their interpersonal decisions and actions
within the rules of the basic structure” (emphasis omitted)). Both Williams and Tan
conclude that any individual duties that attach to the socially advantaged are not a matter
of justice. See Williams, supra, at 228 (principles of justice constrain only the basic
structure); Tan, supra, at 335 (institutional division of labor is necessary to preserving
moral space for personal pursuits).
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law track the interpersonal moral obligations.
78
That is, to the
extent seller is disadvantaged by distributive injustice, his
recourse is political action. He should vote, mobilize, run for
office and protest in the park—but he may not expect his legal
rights and duties vis-a-vis particular private individuals to
adjust based on background injustice.
I have elsewhere argued extensively against this “division
of labor” between private and public law.
79
Without rehearsing all
the arguments, it is worth distinguishing between the pragmatic
and principled arguments for such a division. Pragmatic
arguments to the effect that private law is an ineffectual means
of redressing distributive injustice
80
are compelling, but they
invite context-specific empirical inquiry, and they do not apply to
arguments that private law should take into account distributive
injustice because it alters the moral position of the parties to
contract, not in order to advance material equality directly.
Principled arguments fail because they falsely assume that the
moral valence of individual conduct does not turn on background
institutions, and that individual consent to contract obviates any
background claims that parties to a contract might have had
against one another. If we accept that distributive justice
constrains the bounds of the permissible, then the content of
interpersonal duties must shift to accommodate its demands.
81
In the end, attempts to relegate interpersonal and political
duties to separate spheres do not respond to the underlying feature
78
Most legal economists would limit considerations of distribution to the tax
and transfer system. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
ECONOMICS 153–59 (4th ed. 1993); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT 97–100 (1993); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,Why the Legal System Is Less
Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 677
(1994). Similarly, most legal philosophers writing about private law have favored
excluding distributive considerations from private law. See, e.g., ERNEST J.WEINRIB, THE
IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 80 (1995) (“As an autonomous form of justice, corrective justice
operates on entitlements without addressing the justice of the underlying distribution.”);
Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice, 77
IOWA L. REV. 515, 607 (1992) (“The justification of abstract right and of its principles of
acquisition does not depend in the least on the prior satisfaction of any distributive
requirements of background justice.”); Stephen R. Perry, On the Relationship Between
Corrective and Distributive Justice, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: FOURTH
SERIES 237, 247 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000); Arthur Ripstein, Private Order and Public
Justice: Kant and Rawls, 92 VA. L. REV. 1391, 1395 (2006).
79
See Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Justice and Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONSOFCONTRACTLAW 193 (Klass et al. eds., 2014); Bagchi, supra note 17,at 107–08.
80
Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and
Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV 361, 362 (1991) (showing that
sellers will often pass on the costs of rules intended to benefit buyers).
81
Cf. Kenneth Baynes, Ethos and Institution: On the Site of Distributive Justice,
37 J. SOC. PHIL. 182, 194 (2006) (“[T]he requirements of democratic equality themselves
help to define what is private and what is public, and thus what is or is not appropriately
a more direct site of social justice.”).
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of the problem. The seller’s conduct is not separately wrongful and
defensible; it is wrong only to the extent it is not justified. We need
an integrated account that allows us to judge his actions, all things
considered. Similarly, any account of the governing contract law
that divorces it entirely from interpersonal morality is at odds with
the basic structure of contract law, which depends heavily on
concepts of voluntariness, promise and consent that originate in
the domain of private morality.
82
B. Narrowing the Duty Not to Lie by Specification
A more promising approach is to reconcile the two moral
narratives by further specification. That is, if we press harder on
the question of what makes lying wrong, we might conclude that
lying in this context lacks some features of ordinary lying that
make the latter wrongful. It could be that lying by the seller does
not ultimately qualify as lying at all; or his lies are justified; or
his conduct is excused.
83
Although I am not attempting here to
defend specification over balancing or any other method of sorting
out practical conflict as a general matter,
84
it is important to my
project that I am not arguing that the seller’s actions may be
justified all things considered—indeed, I am not prepared to
defend that claim, which is in some sense broader and in other
respects more modest.
85
I am identifying grounds on which we can
argue that his lie is justified, i.e., that he does not wrong the buyer
by lying to her; and so I will focus on considerations relevant to
the wrongfulness of lying rather than moral considerations
exogenous to the lie.
We have already discussed whether the seller’s conduct
meets the accepted criteria for lying. I will not pursue further
the argument that seller is not really lying at all.
86
Our aim is to
explain why seller’s conduct may not be wrongful, not to explain
why he should not be held responsible. Thus, we are looking for
a morally operative feature of his actions or their circumstances,
not something in seller’s capacities that might mitigate the
82
See Aditi Bagchi, Voluntary Obligation and Contract, 20 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 433, 435 (2018) (discussing the centrality of voluntariness to contract and its
relation to promise and consent).
83
Cf. Joseph Margolis, “Lying Is Wrong” and “Lying Is Not Always Wrong,” 23
PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 414, 415 (1963).
84
SeeH.S.Richardson,Specifying,Balancing, and InterpretingBioethical Principles,
25 J. MED. & PHIL. 285, 289 (2000) (describing specification as a method of resolving moral
conflict); T.M.SCANLON, WHATWEOWETOEACHOTHER 197–202 (1998) (same).
85
It is a more modest claim because it allows that his conduct may be wrong
even if it is a justified lie. It is ambitious because it limits the reasons that might redeem
him to those relevant to the morality of lying.
86
See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
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presumptive wrong of lying. That is, we are looking for
justification, not excuse.
87
In Shiffrin’s terms, I am exploring
whether the seller’s lie takes place in a “justified suspended
context,” or one where the speaker’s insincerity is “reasonable
and justifi[ed].”
88
The root of the justification should lie in the same
circumstances that centered the discussion of self-help and civil
disobedience, namely, background injustice. Interestingly,
MacIntyre attributes to John StuartMill the belief that “[h]abitual
lying is . . . the natural state of those who were both uneducated
and subjected” and describes falsehood as “the universal
concomitant[ ] of oppression.”
89
Mill believed that Indians were
pathological liars for this reason.
90
Although neitherMacIntyre nor
Mill seems to have regarded the phenomenon of mass lying as
justified, the observation does raise the question of why it might be
that oppressed groups would engage in more lying.
91
It is not clear
that Mill was in a position to observe whether Indians lied more
than others as a general matter. But perhaps we can read his
statements as the more modest empirical claim that Indians
regularly lied to the British.
One way to understand the phenomenon, that sheds light
on the matter of our seller, is that the risks to civilization posed
by lying are not so categorical as our earlier discussion of lying
made them out to be.
92
In particular, those risks might be
contained when lies are not told indiscriminately but only in
delimited contexts. Thus, the ability of human beings to know
something of each other and the world might not be jeopardized
by poor sellers lying to rich buyers if the practice of lying is clearly
circumscribed both in the minds of sellers and buyers (when they
come to learn of the lie).
93
87
For the distinction between justification and excuse, see George P. Fletcher,
The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 954 (1985); Kent Greenawalt, The
Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1900 (1984).
88
SHIFFRIN, supra note 27, at 16 (emphasis omitted).
89
MacIntyre, supra note 26, at 307, 329 (internal quotation marks omitted).
90
Id.
91
Some studies suggest that lying may be especially prevalent in highly stratified
societies and may be directed by both social “superiors” and social “inferiors” against one
another. Honestymay be an “in-group” practice. See J. A. BARNES, APACKOFLIES: TOWARDS
ASOCIOLOGYOFLYING 83 (1994).
92
See supra Section II.A.
93
This argument only considers the risks of social contagion, i.e., a general
undermining of the practice of truth-telling, or perhaps interpersonal communication
itself. A separate issue is the risk of self-contagion. That is, it might be that lying to some
buyers undermines sellers’ propensity to tell the truth in other situations. They might
become habitual liars. I set aside this concern because it speaks to the virtue ethics of
lying, and not the question of interpersonal obligation, i.e., whether sellers wrong buyers.
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Moreover, it might be that the benefits of a practice of
truth-telling, including trust, may be so absent from the
relationship between people in highly stratified groups that there
is little lost by lying. Bernard Williams alluded to this possibility.
He described truthfulness as “a form of trustworthiness, that
which relates in a particular way to speech.”
94
But he went on to
say that “[i]n trying to understand Sincerity, . . . we cannot
simply assume [relations of trust]. We need to consider the
various kinds of communicative expectations that obtain between
people who have different kinds of relations to one another . . . .”
95
The question of whether the expectation of trust is warranted is
not morally neutral. We need to consider whether a given listener
is “unoffending” or “someone who no longer deserves the truth.”
96
In our context, we must consider whether buyers can legitimately
expect the truth from sellers.
Why should buyers not expect the truth? One possibility
is that buyers do not trust sellers as a descriptive matter.
97
While
they might update their epistemic beliefs about the product in
light of what a seller claims, they do not trust the seller in the
sense of relating to the seller as a human being with whom the
buyer shares a common fate, such that each takes interest in the
well-being of the other.
98
The same background institutions that
produce inequality are likely to produce such alienation. Absent
trust, duties from sellers to buyers—including truth-telling—
might not apply. Alan Strudler, for example, distinguishes
sharply between two situations: While it is
always morally unacceptable to deceive a person in a way that
breaches his trust, unless that deception is necessary to defend
against a grave wrong. . . . [I]t may be morally acceptable to defend a
person in the absence of trust if that deception is necessary to defend
against an action that may thwart one’s legitimate interests.
99
Onemight worry that permitting lies in response to social
alienation is counterproductive because it will only result in
94
BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS: AN ESSAY IN GENEALOGY
94 (2002).
95
Id. at 111.
96
Id. at 119.
97
Cf. David Wood, Honesty, in PHILOSOPHY AND PERSONAL RELATIONS: AN
ANGLO-FRENCH STUDY (Alan Montefiore ed., 1973) (arguing that a husband who
perpetually distrusts his wife is not entitled to the truth and, more generally, that the
significance of honesty depends on particular social relations).
98
Even where buyers are inclined to believe sellers, their attitude is not properly
described as trusting. The reliability of someone who is merely self-interested to speak the
truth is better described without invoking the concept of trust.SeeAlan Strudler,Deception
and Trust, in THEPHILOSOPHY OFDECEPTION 139 (Clancy Martin ed., 2009).
99
Id. at 152.
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further alienation. This is almost certainly true but the argument
for moral license is not based on a claim that it will cure social
stratification, or inequality, or any other social ill. The claim is that
those who bear the burdens of existing injustice are exempt from
some of the prohibitions that take just relations among individuals
for granted.Wemight compare the argument that lying by vendors
undermines relations across social groups to complaints about self-
segregation in school cafeterias. I refer to the phenomenon that
minority students will often sit together in cafeterias, rather than
integrating into white-majority tables.
100
It is perverse to complain
that such self-segregation undermines community feeling; it is the
racism that motivates self-segregation that undermines
community. While self-segregation by a group that has not been
subject to race-based oppression may be wrong, self-segregation by
minorities usually responds to the background wrongs associated
with racism and it is intended to ameliorate the burdens of racial
status. Refusing to recognize a responsive moral license only
ensures that the personal costs of background injustice are borne
more completely by its primary victims.
Defending the seller’s lies on grounds of the buyer’s lack of
trust has its limit. Such an account places a great deal of weight on
the role of trust in generating a duty not to lie. Although it is an
important way to talk about lying and its wrong, it seems
inadequate because it implies that lying requires some kind of
underlying relationship to be even a prima faciewrong. This goes too
far—we are only looking for an account of contingent justification. In
fact, even Strudler allows that deception may be justified absent
trust only where it protects “legitimate interests.”
101
Moving out of the trust and truth framework, we could
think about lying in Kantian terms as an improper use of a person
as ameans to one’s own ends, effectively usurping buyer’s decision-
right to contribute to the seller’s ends, or not.
102
But a seller may be
released from any duty to defer to the buyer’s right to decide
whether to buy his goods (based on accurate information) because
of her participation in a social structure by which the seller is used
as a means to generate unjust advantage for buyer. That is, while
lying is a kind of disrespect, the duty to respect might require
mutuality, and the disrespect embedded in unjust institutions
might justify some forms of reciprocal disrespect. Kant would not
100
Whether their conduct is properly categorized as self-segregation is already
doubtful. But for purposes of this analogy we can assume that minority students to some
degree voluntarily choose to consort with other minorities over white students.
101
See Strudler, supra note 98, at 152.
102
See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS AK
4:429, at 46–48 (Allen W. Wood ed. & trans., Yale University Press 2002) (1785).
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endorse this move because his form of deontic thinking does not
adjust rights based on the noncompliance of others. But a
requirement of mutuality echoes the principle of reciprocity that
motivates the familiar duty of fair play.
Mutuality or at least some kind of joint engagement may
be quite central to how we understand verbal exchange and the
accompanying duty to speak the truth.
103
If the listener does not
engage with the speaker on terms that justify an expectation of
the truth, then she may have effectively authorized the lie or
even bear responsibility for it; the lie would then extend the
conditions of interaction and would not violate the autonomy of
the listener.
104
Still, institutional disrespect cannot license disrespect
toward other citizens generally, so we need an account of why seller
is justified in engaging in the particular kind of disrespect that is
lying about his goods. Why does the background wrong of
distributive injustice relieve sellers of the duty of truth-telling to
buyers, as opposed to the duty to abide by parking regulations?
Here, we can incorporate the reasoning by which we earlier cast
sellers’ deceit as a form of self-help. Lying is justified where truth-
telling would facilitate a wrong against the speaker by the listener.
As in the self-help discussion above, we can frame the wrong as
aggregate or individual.
105
Truth-telling by the seller would as a
practice worsen his material position and thereby aggravate the
distributive injustice reflected in his social position. Truth-telling
by the seller in a given transaction would enable the buyer to
extract a substantial portion of the gains from trade, contrary to
her duties as a socially advantaged participant in the market. In
either case, the seller’s lie mitigates an ongoing harm and prevents
its imminent worsening. It is justified on those grounds.
106
103
Lies must be assertoric, in that they assert something to be true. Patrick
Leland argues that speakers only make assertions where they assume responsibility to
justify their assertions if challenged, as part of a process of “[r]ational engagement.” Patrick
R. Leland, Rational Responsibility and the Assertoric Character of Bald-Faced Lies, 75
ANALYSIS 550, 551 (2015).
104
See Glen Newey, Political Lying: A Defense, 11 PUB. AFF. Q. 93, 105–06 (1997)
(discussing the relationship between legitimate expectations, autonomy, and lying and
allowing that “lying is prima facie wrong, but . . . its wrongness is conditional on its
violating the autonomy of its (intended) victim” (emphasis omitted)).
105
See supra Section II.B.
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My argument resonates with Strudler’s claims that “the norms of self-defense
may be used to vindicate deception that aims at fending off the prospect of economic harm.”
Strudler, supra note 98, at 145. However, Strudler allows the defense only to protect
proprietary information that your adversary in a negotiation has no right to know. Id. at
146. For the argument to extend to the hypothetical transaction, it requires separately
showing that buyer has no right to know the truth with respect to the product she is buying.
There is no reason to think that Strudler would sign on to that proposition, though there
are reasons (set out in the text of this article) that buyers may have no such right.
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Just as important to the background and prospective
harm to seller are the benefits and harms to the buyer. It is
important that the seller has reason to believe that the buyer is
part of the group that unjustly benefits from background
injustice. And it is important that he reasonably believe that,
but for his lie, the buyer will benefit disproportionately from
their exchange. The background unjust benefits enjoyed by the
buyer makes her loss in this particular transaction a mere
mitigation. And her willing participation in a transaction that
would worsen the inequality that exists between her and the
seller marks her with a distinctive responsibility that justifies
the seller’s imposition of a loss on her.
One might wonder whether the implication of the
analysis of the buyer’s position is that the seller’s lies are only
justified when he is right about the buyer, i.e., when she really
is rich. Or perhaps, the likelihood that he will be wrong in a
number of cases renders the lies unjustified altogether. There
are at least two reasons to think that the seller’s uncertainty
about the status of any given buyer does not importantly affect
the moral calculus here, as long as his assumptions are justified
as a matter of probability, i.e., if he is right most of the time.
The first consideration is that the harm that seller is
licensed to impose on buyers is a relatively trivial one. It is
unlikely that anyone who will suffer greatly from a loss of about
twenty dollars will be on the market—even a street market—for
a cashmere scarf in the first place. And, of course, they are not
literally deprived of twenty dollars but simply have an inferior
scarf, so no important moral interest is in jeopardy. The analysis
would be entirely different if the seller were selling impure baby
formula or medicine. In this case, whether the buyer is privileged
or not, her interest in physical integrity is of a qualitatively
different nature than the seller’s interest in either mitigation or
protection, and misrepresenting the nature of the product would
not be justified on grounds of either self-help or self-protection.
The second consideration that allows the seller to reason
probabilistically about the buyer’s status is the nature of the
impersonal platform in which seller and buyer encounter one
another. Street markets are impersonal places. All the
calculations that go into the parties’ terms of exchange are set by
their probabilistic knowledge of the market. This is not a context
where buyer can reasonably be expected to be treated as a unique
individual. Together with her low stakes, this market context
entitles the seller to calibrate his treatment of the buyer based on
what little he knows about her.
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C. Specification of Cheating
I turn now to a far briefer discussion of cheating, or the
overcharging relative to other sellers and buyers. The general
expectation that sellers will not charge certain buyers more than
others seems legitimate only before we learn of substantial
differences among sellers, and among buyers. Once we learn that
sellers face different costs, have different needs, and enjoy
different levels of opportunity, it is less surprising that theymight
not all charge the same price. Similarly, once we learn that buyers
differ in their purchasing power and interest in buying a good, it
is not surprising that they would pay different prices for it. Of
course, it is usually the case that it is not possible or worthwhile
for a seller to attempt to discriminate among buyers.
107
But the
seller’s self-restraint does not reflect a moral obligation. We
recognize an obligation against nondiscrimination only where the
group that would be disadvantaged is in fact a generally socially
disadvantaged group. Our practice is consistent with the principle
proposed by Anthony Kronman with respect to advantage—
taking in a transactional setting.
108
Advantage-taking of a given
sort is permissible, on his view, only where a rule allowing it
works to the long-run advantage of the disadvantaged.
109
It is
likely that some kinds of fraud or deception—watering downmilk,
for example—would harm low-income consumers. Rules that
regulate price discrimination between low- and high-income
buyers, however, would protect high-end buyers at the expense of
low-income sellers.
110
Thus, there is no reason to endorse a
principle of general nondiscrimination among buyers. Sellers are
not only legally, but morally free to overcharge customers, and it
is not properly characterized as “cheating” after all.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTRACT THEORY ANDDOCTRINE
The discussion above suggests that interpersonal private
moral obligation depends on background political justice. It
should be easier to establish that interpersonal legal obligations
107
See Mark Armstrong, Recent Developments in the Economics of Price
Discrimination, in 2 ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS, NINTHWORLDCONGRESS OF THEECONOMETRIC SOCIETY, 97, 99 (Richard
Blundell et al. eds., 2006); RICHARDA. POSNER, ANTITRUSTLAW 80 (2d ed. 2001); Michael
J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55, 59 (2001).
108
Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J.
472, 492 (1980).
109
Id.
110
If sellers could discriminate on the basis of purchasing power, they would
charge high-end buyers more and low-end buyers less, because high-end buyers are likely
to be less price sensitive.
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(private law obligations) should also depend on background
political justice. Many legal observers reject the very idea of
private law as a body of law animated by distinct principles from
those that drive public law.
111
Those scholars should directly
embrace the idea that contract is subject to the same principles
of political morality that constrain other legal institutions that
are integral to the basic structure of society. Other scholars
regard private law as importantly different from public law
because it entitles individuals to hold other private persons
accountable on the express grounds that they have been
wronged.
112
Private law theorists of this sort too should consider
private law within the domain of distributive justice if the
interpersonal moral obligations that underlie private claims
themselves depend on distributive justice.
Even if the permeability of private law to political justice is
established as a theoretical matter, the transaction we have studied
in-depth reveals why it is challenging to regulate contract by
reference to political principles. To the extent that the moral defect
of the transaction lies in the basic structure alone, there is no reason
that a particular buyer should pay for it with a poor-quality scarf.
She would be no more responsible than anyone who accepts a large
tax refund, or anyone who does not add some extra amount to her
tax submissions based on an estimation of how much more she
should owe. While a beneficiary of unjust tax laws may have an
imperfect duty to help the disadvantaged, she is not responsible for
anymargin of disadvantage suffered by any particular person.What
distinguishes the buyer in our hypothetical?
Locating responsibility in the buyer of the scarf pins a
great deal on the happenstance of her encountering a dishonest
street seller. But he is not her friend, she is not involved in his
life, she does not owe him anything more or less than any other
citizen owes every other citizen. Why her? The trick lies in
finding an account of her transaction that is particular without
falsely characterizing it as personal. Her admittedly arbitrary
encounter with the street seller puts her in a relationship with
him—to be sure, a short and impersonal one—but one that is
distinguishable from her fully anonymized interactions with the
state. It is enough to set her apart from other advantaged people,
and to justify his placing a special burden on her—albeit a small
111
See John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1645–46 (2012) (describing “private law skepticism”).
112
See id., at 1650–51 (defending the concept of private law and introducing the
idea of “New Private Law”); WEINRIB, supra note 78, at 3, 10–11.
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burden, proportional to her role in the larger injustice that has
put seller in his place.
How might we incorporate these propositions, and our
extended analysis of the hypothetical, into our understanding of
consumer contract law? First, we have reason to be less categorical
in our protection of consumers from fraud. The social status of
consumers is too heterogeneous to sustain consumers as a legal
status, however politically appealing the latter status might be.
113
Consumer protection has cross-class appeal but consumers are a
disparate class among themselves. Moreover, they are neither
consistently advantaged nor disadvantaged vis-a-vis sellers. The
use of consumers as a group against whose interests whole
categories of law can be assessed—not only in consumer law but
also in competition policy, for example
114
—is motivated in large
part by the sheer numerosity of consumers, which makes their
welfare of preeminent significance in both an aggregate welfare
analysis and a simple political calculus. But we have seen that
there are circumstances under which particular classes of sellers
can legitimately regard their buyers as relatively advantaged, and
“exploitation” of those rich buyers is of complicated moral valence.
Second, consumer contract law can be modified to
recognize that lies are sometimes justified. We can do this directly
by adjusting the standard for what qualifies as a lie (that is, the
standard for either contractual misrepresentation or consumer
fraud), or more indirectly through selective enforcement of
contract and consumer law. For example, a party must usually
show that she has relied on a representation in order to rescind a
contract on its basis.
115
Courts could systematically refrain from
finding that consumers have relied on representations from street
sellers (or at the very least, decline to recognize any false
implicatures from seller’s statements) or we could create a
presumption that any statements by street sellers are “mere
puffery” on which consumers cannot reasonably rely.
116
These
legal presumptions about, or characterizations of, market
behavior will have a feedback effect on what parties’ reasonable
113
See Aditi Bagchi, The Political Economy of Regulating Contract, 62 AM. J.
COMP. L. 687, 702–10 (2014) (discussing role of heterogeneity in regulating contract); cf.
Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulatory Techniques in Consumer Protection: A
Critique of European Consumer Contract Law, 50 COMMONMKT. L. REV. 109, 114 (2013)
(“When consumers are heterogeneous, a one-size-fits-all mandatory approach necessarily
hurts certain subgroups of consumers.”).
114
See generally Gregory J. Werden, Competition, Consumer Welfare, & the
Sherman Act, 9 SEDONA CONF. J. 87 (2008).
115
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (AM. LAW INST. 1979)
116
See David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395,
1411 (2006) (“Courts deem statements that could not induce reasonable reliance to be
nonactionable puffery.”).
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expectations really are. The active construction of the market
through legal rules thus allows those rules to improve the ethical
code by which participants abide, in the specific sense of
rendering them responsive to other institutional commitments—
and deficiencies.
If courts and adjudicative administrative bodies do not
alter their standards, consumer law enforcement agencies can
alter their practices. Politically, street sellers are an easy target.
They will offer little organized resistance to any crackdown on
misrepresentations. (Realistically, consumers are unlikely to
attempt to rescind the sales through a judicial tribunal, so only
administrative enforcement is relevant.) But agency directors
who reflect on their moral mandate can choose to direct their
limited enforcement dollars toward targets that prey on
vulnerable consumers, and in particular, on consumers who are
more vulnerable than the sellers who stand to benefit from their
own misrepresentations. In fact, even if an enforcement officer is
not persuaded that deceit is ultimately licensed, it might make
sense for her to abandon enforcement in some contexts in light of
the de facto boundaries of legal enforcement. The law cannot
sustain honesty on the street on its own,
117
and a second-best of
arbitrary intervention might be worse. If the phenomenon of
deceitful self-help is sufficiently pervasive, cracking down on this
conduct may only politicize it, ultimately elevating its status to
that of resistance, if not civil disobedience. On the other hand,
declining to enforce consumer fraud laws in some markets would
not kill misrepresentation as a basis for seller liability as such. It
would only treat the regressive character of somemarket segment
as a trigger for heightened enforcement scrutiny.
Our argument for why lies by street sellers may be
justified was contingent on the absence of any relationship of
trust between seller and buyer. When a seller communicates
with a buyer in such a way as to invite such trust, his lies are
probably no longer justified.
118
At least, we have not explored the
ramifications of betraying trust that one has specifically set out
to cultivate. However, while consumer law might very well aim
to promote trust in society writ large by ferreting out sellers who
depart from accepted standards of social conduct, it is not in the
business of enforcing the terms of relationships—just the terms
117
See THOMAS CARSON, LYING AND DECEPTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 177
(2010) (“No legal system can effectively police and deter rampant and universal dishonesty
in the economic sphere.”).
118
See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.
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of legal agreements.
119
It should not matter to the legal status of
a seller’s representation whether the seller was very friendly to
the buyer in the course of the sale. This is true even though the
details of the interaction between a seller and buyer may be
important to whether the seller’s deceit is ultimately justified
from a moral point of view.
More generally speaking, the arguments in this article do
not purport to establish that disadvantaged persons can lie to and
cheat advantaged persons categorically. There are more fully
private realms of interaction where our political claims are of
diminished significance. For example, in a game of chess, we
would not expect the wealthier player to forfeit her rook at the
start. But unlike games, contract is not a realm separate and
apart from political justice. Unlike love and friendship, it does not
even aspire to be separate from state institutions in the self-
understanding of its parties. Parties to contract have chosen to
avail themselves of a state-operated regime to buttress their
exchange relationship. To the extent parties in even those
domains of life that seem most distant from political justice, such
as marriage, similarly avail themselves of state machinery, the
state may be similarly obligated to take into account the
distributive implications of its policies.
Finally, our study of the exchange transaction here offers
some lessons regarding consideration. Consumer advocates—
especially those protective of low-income consumers—are
sometimes tempted to require something like proportionality of
consideration, or equivalence in exchange.
120
In the vast majority
of cases, market mechanisms suffice to ensure that parties
transact for goods and services at the market rate, adjusted for
oddities in their transaction. In some cases, avoiding transaction
costs, especially search costs and other information costs, might
cause a consumer to pay far more than she would otherwise
pay.
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Consumer advocates would have us find these
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for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847, 860 (2000) (“[R]estricting the
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transactions unconscionable on the grounds that buyers have
grossly over-paid.
The discussion here should give us pause. Nothing here
suggests that courts should protect vendors who fleece poor
buyers. To the contrary, the upshot of the argument here is that
the law should take into account the status of parties to a
transaction because it may inform their duties to each other.
Thus, courts and legislatures should be protective of low-income
buyers because they are poor and not because they are
consumers. It should be just as solicitous of poor vendors. A
“class-blind” rule that favors equivalence in exchange will not
properly track moral obligations in exchange.
A rule that consistently favors the disadvantaged across
the board is self-defeating because it will result in their effective
exclusion from the marketplace.
122
It is an empirical question how
protective the legal rules surrounds exchange can be of the
socially disadvantaged in any transactional setting without
triggering perverse effects.
123
In our hypothetical, it will depend,
for example, on whether buyers and sellers presently respond to
legal protection, i.e., whether they would alter their conduct in its
absence, as well as how much knowledge they have of the
frequency with which sellers lie. We hold street sellers
accountable for their lies to the extent those lies undermine the
material position of other street sellers. We should not, however,
devote enforcement resources to policing their lies for the sake of
the buyers to whom they lie.
CONCLUSION
We started with a hypothetical sale and you, the reader,
were cast in the role of buyer. However, our focus has been on
the moral plight of the seller. His moral situation is challenging.
On the one hand, we do not wish too easily to exempt him from
ordinary moral principles—and what is more ordinary than the
admonishment not to lie? We are constituted as moral agents in
part by the moral principles to which we are held, and it would
be actually disrespectful to be less morally demanding of the
seller on grounds of his poverty.
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On the other hand, given how vastly disparate our
circumstances, it would be strange if there was no important
difference among us with respect to our claims and obligations to
each other. Talking about the justice of institutions, including the
justice of particular laws, can obscure these differences among us,
because the relevant question becomes how institutions should be
modified. We tend to talk about the social measures that we
should take to ameliorate distributive injustice, whether along
lines of class, race or disability. Those discussions are important
but we should also spend time in the vantage point of individuals.
What do we each owe and to what are we each entitled in the
world as we now find it? To the extent the philosophical literature
broaches these questions, we may be too absorbed in the ethics of
advantage.
124
What do the talented owe the untalented? What
constitutes wrongful discrimination?
This article is a modest attempt to contemplate the
perspective of the wronged. What is required of them? In
particular, how are the obligations of individuals to other
individuals compromised by background justice deficits? Because
the argument that I have proffered to justify the seller’s lie makes
a number of factual and moral assumptions, I do not purport to
have established that seller does not wrong buyer by lying to her.
However, I have illustrated a form of argument that can be used
to justify prima facie wrongdoing that is responsive to background
injustice. My tentative conclusion that poor sellers may be
justified in lying to rich buyers is unsettling in part because it
suggests other, perhaps more disruptive moral licenses, such as
those that low-wage employees might hold against their
employers. May low-wage employees take breaks when they are
on the clock, even where they are not legally entitled to those
breaks and their employers prohibit them?
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May low-wage
employees falsely claim that they are ill when they will be
terminated for absence on any other grounds?
126
In examples
involving low-wage employment, we might be tempted to locate
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the primary wrong in the employer, without relying on any
political injustice to justify employee conduct. But it is likely that
many employers are themselves constrained and cannot afford to
compensate employees on better terms than other employers in
the industry; the wrong of oppressive working conditions and
avoidable vulnerability to illness is ultimately a public one as
well. Nevertheless, many people will be comfortable imposing
some losses on the particular employers who happen to employ
the socially disadvantaged.
Popular intuition supports the contention that social
injustice distorts the morality of private behavior in other
contexts too. Feminists in the #MeToo movement often claim that
women who report sexual harassment or assault should be
believed.
127
Taking any given allegation on its own, this is a
puzzling contention.Why would we believe one sex over the other,
without knowing more? But we already recognize that public
reasons justify defaults of judgment, most notably, the
presumption of innocence that applies in the context of a criminal
trial. Perhaps the imperative to remedy public injustice
justifies—in other contexts—adopting a different principle of
judgment that is morally and rationally indefensible but for
background injustice. Under exactly what conditions we can
justify a default in favor of believing accusers is a hard question.
It gets at the ultimate question of whether and under what
conditions the disadvantaged can ever justify inflicting loss on the
advantaged in the name of redress, or what proportionality
entails in a given context. Some harms are surely never a
permissible response to background injustice—for example,
presuming criminal guilt. But other harms, such as the loss of
certain employment opportunities or prestige to which no one is
in principle entitled, are less obviously off the table. I cannot sort
out here the criteria that must be met before a person or
institution deliberately subjects aman to consequences as a result
of an allegation of sexual misconduct, but it is likely that those
criteria are different under patriarchy than under conditions of
sexual equality.
To be sure, it is always unfair in some sense when
someone is worse off as a result of wrongdoing outside her
control. But in the case of harms that flow from the oppressed to
the privileged, the experience of harm is not necessarily an
injustice separate from the underlying wrong that cast the
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oppressed and the privileged in their respective social roles.
After all, the starting point for our inquiry is that people already
suffer under injustice. How closely should we guard the gates
around the first-order victims of public injustice? If we
collectively allow harm to lie where it falls, must those who bear
those harms do the same or are they entitled to spread their
suffering around? If we are to reject self-help by the socially
disadvantaged, what alternative course of action is justified in
its place? What may they do about the injustice in which they
find themselves? What picture of moral agency requires that
they do nothing more than wait? I worry about a moral-political
framework that is so unequally demanding of its subjects.
What we owe each other depends on the larger social
structures within which we act, and when those structures are
wrongful, it has consequences for the moral lives of its inhabitants.
The consequences of distributive injustice, in particular for our
private moral lives, are sweeping and almost breathtaking. The
possibility that poor sellers are justified in lying to their fellow
citizens on the streets is among the myriad ways in which
background injustice corrupts civic life in a polity.
